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FARMWORKERS, NONIMMIGRATION POLICY,




Congress has enacted various laws allowing foreign workers to
harvest America's crops on nonimmigrant guest-worker visas.
During World War II, Mexican farmworkers contracted their labor in
the United States under the Bracero system.1 The H-2 visa, created in
1952, allowed foreign temporary contract workers to perform
unskilled labor-both agricultural and nonagricultural. 2 The current
H-2A visa, developed in 1986 out of the H-2 visa, allows foreign
workers to perform temporary agricultural labor in the United States
on a contract basis.3
Nonimmigrant visas for farmworkers have been controversial
since their inception.4  The United States adopted its first guest-
worker programs under great pressure from growers.5 Congress
abandoned the Bracero program in the 1960s due to its abusive
* NAPIL Equal Justice Fellow working for Colorado Legal Services' Migrant Farm
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Professor Roberto Corrada, Colorado Legal Services Migrant Division Managing Attorney
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She would also like to thank University of Denver College of Law Professor Nancy Ehrenreich
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of Denver's Chancellor's Scholarship, which alleviates the debt burden for students pursuing
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1. See Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, 57 Stat. 70; Act of Feb. 14, 1944, ch. 14, 58 Stat. 11; Act
of Aug. 9, 1946, ch. 934, 60 Stat. 969.
2. See Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 214, 66 Stat. 163,
168, 189 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), 1186 (Supp. V 1987)).
3. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2000).
4. See generally CINDY HAHAMOVITCH, THE POLITICS OF LABOR SCARCITY:
EXPEDIENCY AND THE BIRTH OF THE AGRICULTURAL "GUESTWORKERS" PROGRAM (Center
for Immigration Studies Backgrounder, Dec. 1999).
5. See id. at 2-4.
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nature.6 Farmworker advocates harshly criticized the H-2 visa, both
for the abusive treatment that H-2 workers experienced, and for its
effect on farmworkers' wages and working conditions.
7
This Note discusses the effectiveness of the H-2A visa and the
problems associated with agricultural guest workers. Part I addresses
the historical background of farm laborers, the Immigration Reform
and Control Act ("IRCA") of 1986 that authorizes the H-2A visa,
and case law interpreting IRCA. Part II analyzes the problems
associated with H-2A workers, including the susceptibility of H-2A
workers to abuse, the inability of H-2A workers to protect their
rights, and the H-2A visa's adverse effects on U.S. workers, including
loss of jobs and deteriorating wages and conditions. This Part also
discusses whether H-2A workers enter a state of involuntary
servitude and the absence of a need for the H-2A visa. Part I
includes an underview, a close look at the H-2A visa as used in the
sheepherding industry, and a discussion of possible solutions to the
inadequacies of the H-2A visa. Part III concludes this Note with a
look at the future of the H-2A visa system.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical
Agricultural workers have long been treated differently from
other workers in the United States. Since the end of slavery-with
the exception of the "Okies" during the Great Depression-
agricultural workers have tended to be foreign-born and nonwhite. 9
Since the 1890s, employers have recruited Chinese, Filipinos,
Japanese, and Mexicans to harvest American crops.'0  Growers
6. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
7. See generally H. Michael Semler, Overview: The H-2 Program: Aliens in the Orchard:
The Admission of Foreign Contract Laborers for Temporary Work in U.S. Agriculture, 1 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 187 (1983).
8. During the Great Depression, the drought in the central United States displaced a
multitude of families from Oklahoma, Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas. JOHN STEINBECK, THE
HARVEST GYPSIES: ON THE ROAD TO THE GRAPES OF WRATH 21 (1988). Their lands
destroyed, they went west, searching for employment. See id. Many of these displaced families
became migrant workers in California and other states, and were disparagingly known as
"Okies." Charles Wollenberg, Introduction to STEINBECK, supra, at v, xi.
9. See, e.g., BRENT ASHABRANNER, DARK HARVEST: MIGRANT FARMWORKERS IN
AMERICA 21-22 (1985); Wollenberg, supra note 8, at xi.
10. During the 1870s and 1880s, American born "bindlestiffs" harvested the great wheat
farms. Wollenberg, supra note 8, at xi. But as large farms shifted to more labor-intensive fruits
and vegetables, employers began to use Chinese workers. See id. As U.S. laws restricted
Chinese immigration, employers recruited workers from Japan, southern Europe, and India,
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tended to look to a new labor source each time a group of workers
attempted to strike or collectively bargain.11 Only in agriculture does
the United States allow foreign contract workers to dominate the
local work force.
1 2
America's newest method of obtaining cheap, docile foreign
farm labor is the H-2A visa. 3 This visa allows growers to import
foreign workers on an employment contract for a period of temporary
or seasonal work.14 The visa's real value, from the growers' point of
view, is that the workers may work only for the employer who
petitioned for them and must return to their home country as soon as
the contract period ends.,, This places the H-2A visa workers in a
powerless condition compared to U.S. workers who can leave an
abusive employer and seek other work.1 6  In addition, because the
employee will have no opportunity to grow old in this country, the
employer does not have to contribute to benefits such as social
security. The H-2A worker has few rights and is unlikely to assert
even those rights. For these reasons, H-2A visas provide a desirable
source of labor for agribusiness.
and later from Mexico and the Philippines. See id. During World War II, Congress, through the
Act of Apr. 29, 1943, authorized Mexican workers to enter the United States as contract
agricultural workers, dubbed "Braceros." See ERASMO GAMBOA, MEXICAN LABOR AND
WORLD WAR II: BRACEROS IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, 1942-1947, at xii (1990). The Act of
Apr. 29, 1943 brought 220,640 Mexican laborers to the United States during the Bracero period.
See id. at 48. The word bracero means a worker who works with his hands or arms. See id. at
133 n.1; see also ASHABRANNER, supra note 9, at 65. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, migrant
farmworkers came from China, Japan, and the Philippines to work in the West. See id. at 21-22.
Immigrants from Ireland, Italy, and Scandinavia worked in the East. See id. at 22. Southern
blacks and whites worked in southern fields and later replaced the European immigrants
harvesting crops in the East and the Midwest. See id. Mexican Americans worked in the
Southwest and California. See id.
11. "If they attempted to organize they were deported or arrested, and having no
advocates they were never able to get a hearing for their problems." STEINBECK, supra note 8,
at 21. During the depression, when the United States was repatriating Mexican migrant
workers, the National Labor Board reported: "Fundamentally, much of the trouble with
Mexican labor in the Imperial Valley [California] lies in the natural desire of the workers to
organize." Id. at 54. Steinbeck wrote that, like Chinese and Japanese workers, Mexican
migrants "committed the one crime that will not be permitted by the large growers. They...
attempted to organize." Id. at 55.
12. See generally Semler, supra note 7, at 206-10.
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a).
14. See id.
15. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.90(b) (2000); Gail S. Coleman, Note, Overcoming Mootness in the
H-2A Temporary Foreign Farmworker Program, 78 GEO. L.J. 197, 197-200 (1989).
16. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER
PROGRAM: CHANGES COULD IMPROVE SERVICES TO EMPLOYERS AND BETTER PROTECT
WORKERS 9-10 (GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, June 24, 1998) [hereinafter GAO/T-HEHS-98-2001.
2000]
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Since 1848, when the United States absorbed northern Mexico
and its residents with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 17 U.S.
immigration policy toward Mexico has fluctuated between recruiting
and repatriating Mexican citizens, according to American demands
for labor." Following the 1848 treaty, most Mexicans living in the
former Mexican territories automatically became U.S. citizens by
remaining in the United States. 19 The United States paid little
attention to immigration across the newly defined international
border until the next century. 0
Throughout the twentieth century, Mexican immigration to the
United States was based on employment.21 While the immigration
has been continuous, the United States's response has varied
depending upon economics. 2 The de facto policy has been, "bring
[Mexican laborers] in when they are needed, send them back when
they aren't. 2 3 John Steinbeck wrote, in 1936, that the Mexican
worker could be treated as "scrap when it was not needed," and "if it
offered any resistance to the low wage or the terrible living
conditions, it could be deported to Mexico at Government expense.
'24
The 1917 Immigration Act waived certain immigration requirerents
for temporary workers,25 allowing U.S. growers to continue to rely on
Mexican workers. 26  The United States legally admitted more than
300,000 Mexican immigrants between 1900 and 1930, and as many as
17. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb.
2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922. For a discussion of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, see Kevin
R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and U.S.Mexico Relations: The Tale of Two
Treaties, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 121,127-30 (1998).
18. From 1910 to 1920, the booming American economy demanded labor. See GAMBOA,
supra note 10, at xiii. The United States's open immigration policy allowed agricultural and
railroad employers to recruit Mexican workers on a large scale. See id. But when the United
States suffered a flattened economy during the depression, employers no longer needed
Mexican immigrant labor. See id. During World War II, an American labor shortage again
caused employers to look south of the border. See id. at xii. Mexican workers filled the
tremendous need for farm production at a time when the agricultural economy was labor
starved. See id. When the war ended, Braceros were no longer needed. Strikes and
administrative changes in the Bracero program caused employers to replace the Mexican
workers with "less troublesome Chicano workers." Id. at xiv.
19. See James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical Examination
of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227, 242 (1995).
20. See id. at 242 & n.89.
21. See id. at 242.
22. See id.
23. Smith, supra note 19, at 242 (quoting Walter Fogel, Illegal Alien Workers in the United
States, 16 INDUS. REL. 243, 246 (1977)).
24. STEINBECK, supra note 8, at 54.
25. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877-78.
26. See Smith, supra note 19, at 243. The commissioner of immigration waived the literacy
requirements, head tax, and contract labor laws for Mexican workers. See id.
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one million undocumented immigrants moved north of the border
during the same period.
2
1
But during the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the Mexican
immigration pendulum swung to the other side, and Mexican workers
found themselves no longer welcome in the United States.s Between
1929 and 1932, 345,000 Mexicans were repatriated to Mexico.29 By
strictly enforcing immigration laws, the United States reduced
Mexican immigration from 4000 to 250 people per month.0
When the depression ended and labor was once again needed,
the pendulum swung back and the United States welcomed Mexican
workers. During World War II, the United States and Mexico signed
a series of agreements known as the Bracero program.31 The Bracero
system allowed Mexican workers to enter the United States without
paying a head tax or meeting contract labor provisions and literacy
requirements. 32 California alone drew more than 100,000 Braceros
annually.
33
While many historians have written that the Bracero program
resulted from a wartime labor shortage,34 an article published by the
Center for Immigration Studies asserts that no shortage existed. 35
Instead, growers who did not want to pay higher than depression-era
wages pressured the federal government into signing the Bracero
agreement. 36 Federal officials noted before the war that the farm
labor surplus was so great that more than 1.5 million people could
leave farm work without harming agricultural production.37 During
27. See id. at 242 (citing Lawrence H. Fuchs & Susan B. Forbes, Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy [SCIRPI, U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest,
reprinted in THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS
AND POLICY 40, 53 (2d ed. 1985)).
28. See id. at 243.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 243-44.
31. See Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, 57 Stat. 70; Act of Feb. 14, 1944, ch. 14, 58 Stat. 11; Act
of Aug. 9, 1946, ch. 934, 60 Stat. 969. American growers were ecstatic about the program,
because it provided them with inexpensive and steady labor when American workers were busy
in the armed forces. See ASHABRANNER, supra note 9, at 65.
32. See Smith, supra note 19, at 244 n.101.
33. See TONY DUNBAR & LINDA KRAVITZ, HARD TRAVELING: MIGRANT FARM
WORKERS IN AMERICA 43 (1976).
34. See, e.g., GAMBOA, supra note 10, at xi.
35. See HAHAMOVITCH, supra note 4, at 2-4.
36. See id. at 3-4.
37. See id. at 2.
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the war, officials recognized that wages needed to rise, and growers
who lacked labor should provide safe housing and clean water.3
8
Faced with opposition from labor unions39 and civil rights groups
during the 1960s, Congress began to reevaluate the Bracero
program.40 After Edward R. Murrow's "Harvest of Shame" television
documentary exposed "squalid living conditions and abuse,
'41
Congress became concerned about the condition of farm laborers and
feared that the employment of Bracero workers gave growers little
incentive to provide decent wages and living conditions. 42  The
Bracero program culminated in "massive civil rights and labor
violations and depressed wages in the Southwest."' 43  Braceros
"worked for whom they were told, at whatever tasks they were told,
under whatever wages and working conditions.., and when no
longer wanted, they were shipped back to Mexico." 44 The Bracero
system drove down wages for farmworkers from both sides of the
38. See id. at 2. Officials also noted that the growers who most boisterously insisted that a
labor shortage existed were the growers who paid the lowest wages, contrary to the laws of
supply and demand. See id. at 2. Growers, long "accustomed to 'a great over-supply of
workers... consider[ed] any reduction in the surplus supply as a shortage."' Id.
39. See ASHABRANNER, supra note 9, at 65. The use of Bracero workers impeded
organized labor. See, e.g., OTEY M. SCRUGGS, BRACEROS, "WETBACKS," AND THE FARM
LABOR PROBLEM: MEXICAN AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1942-1954, at
525-26 (1988). In 1953, the displacement of local farm laborers by Braceros caused the National
Agricultural Workers Union to lose its toehold in southern California's Imperial Valley. See id.
at 526. In 1954, the increased use of Braceros, coupled with mechanization, "made union
activity impossible" in California's Central Valley. Id.
40. See Smith, supra note 19, at 244-45.
41. Leah Beth Ward, Desperate Harvest: N.C. Growers' Trade in Foreign Farm Workers
Draws Scrutiny, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Oct. 31, 1999, at Al.
42. See Smith, supra note 19, at 244-45. By 1947, the use of Braceros "contribute[d]
noticeably to the plight of" American workers. SCRUGGS, supra note 39, at 500. An
immigration official wrote in 1950, "The farmer's principal reason for demanding. . . contract
aliens is the fact that this type of laborer is willing to work for much lower pay than the local or
migrant can work for." Id. at 507. American workers had to either look for work elsewhere or
accept work at Bracero wages. See id. at 510.
43. Stephen Yale-Loehr, Foreign Farm Workers in the U.S.: The Impact of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 333, 334 (1986-87); see
also Johnson, supra note 17, at 135. Increasing the supply of unskilled labor in agriculture
decreased wages. See id. The Bracero system purportedly protected farmworker wages and
working conditions, but the United States failed to enforce the protections and instead allowed
growers to pay substandard wages. See id. at 136.
44. HENRY P. ANDERSON, THE BRACERO PROGRAM IN CALIFORNIA [at unnumbered
Introduction to the 1976 Edition] (1976). Anderson wrote of the Bracero system:
[I]njustice is built into the present system, and no amount of patching and tinkering
will make of it a just system .... [F]oreign contract farm labor programs ... by their
very nature wreak harm upon the lives of the persons directly and indirectly involved
and upon human rights which our Constitution still holds to be self-evident and
inalienable.
[Vol. 76:1271
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border.45 Congress allowed the Bracero program to expire in 1963,46
and the Immigration Act of 1965 placed new limits on immigration.4
7
In 1952, Congress created the H-2 visa as part of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. 48  Unlike the Bracero program, the H-2 visa
allowed both agricultural and nonagricultural temporary contract
workers to enter the United States and did not apply only to Mexican
workers. 49 Although the H-2 program was only slightly used during
the next twenty years, abuses became apparent, as they had with the
Bracero program. 0 One author wrote of Jamaican sugarcane cutters
who entered the United States on H-2 visas:
The Jamaican H-2 worker is for the cane growers the perfect farm
laborer-a man of the barracks, a man in a camp who spends all of
his time under supervision if not under surveillance, surrounded by
barbed wire. A man without a family who will never be part of the
larger community; who has no hope of a better job or indeed any
job in this country other than swinging a machete eight hours a day.
A man who will never vote in Florida, never join a union, and never
go to court to correct an injustice. 1
Agribusiness prefers guest workers to other workers-not
because they are cheaper-but because the growers wield near
"absolute control" over them.52 The growers decide where the
workers will be housed. 3 They control the workers' movements,
because the workers come without cars. 4 If a worker fails to meet his
production quota, the grower can send him back home, and the
worker has no "right of appeal."55  "The fear of being sent back
before his contract is completed, or of not being selected for another
year, ensures that almost every worker will exhaust himself at his
labor. "56
45. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 135-36. Agribusiness benefited from cheap labor, while
U.S. workers lost jobs. See id. at 136. Farmworker wages in California sank, farmworker
housing deteriorated, and unions experienced increased barriers to organizing. See id. By
hiring Braceros, agribusiness could avoid housing families because only solo workers were
admitted. See id. at 136 n.76 (citing JULIAN SAMORA, Los MOJADOs: THE WETBACK STORY 81
(1971)).
46. See Smith, supra note 19, at 245.
47. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1151).
48. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)(15)(H)(ii), 214.
49. See id.
50. See Coleman, supra note 15, at 203.
51. ASHABRANNER, supra note 9, at 101.







In 1986, Congress split the H-2 program into two parts: the H-2A
visa for agricultural workers, and the H-2B visa for nonagricultural
workers.5 7 This current legislation requires that nonimmigrant aliens,
known as H-2A workers, have a residence in a foreign country that
they have no intention of abandoning and that they temporarily come
to the United States "to perform agricultural labor or services, as
defined by the Secretary of Labor. 58 The H-2A program is designed
to meet the temporary needs of growers "who require temporary
agricultural labor which cannot be met by the national labor force."59
The Department of Labor ("DOL") adopted separate certification
procedures for agricultural workers "because of its experience with
employer abuse of migrant and seasonal agricultural workers." 60
The H-2A visa was purportedly designed to meet two conflicting
policy goals: to protect U.S. workers and, concurrently, provide easy
access to labor.61 The creation of the H-2A program is consistent with
Congress's pendulum approach to immigrant workers. The H-2A
visa allows workers to enter the United States when they are needed
and forces them to leave at the expiration of their contract.62 Like the
Bracero system-which was created to alleviate an alleged wartime
labor shortage, but was nevertheless used regularly for decades-the
H-2A visa purports to be used only in emergency labor shortages, but
instead is used as a general source of labor.63
B. IRCA of 1986
1. IRCA, Legislative History, and Regulations
The H-2A visa is created by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) of
IRCA. The process for certifying H-2A workers is governed by 20
C.F.R. Part 655, Subpart B (2000). The regulations' alleged purpose
is to determine whether U.S. workers are available, and "whether the
57. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b).
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a).
59. Steven S. Mukamal & Martin L. Rothstein, The "H" Visa Category, in BASIC
IMMIGRATION LAW: 1995, at 73, 76 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series
No. H4-5215, Apr.-May 1995).
60. Martinez v. Reich, 934 F. Supp. 232, 237 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
61. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.0(a)(1) (2000).
62. See id. § 655.90(b).
63. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER
PROGRAM: CHANGES COULD IMPROVE SERVICES TO EMPLOYERS AND BETTER PROTECT
WORKERS 8 (GAO/T-HEHS-98-20, Dec. 1997) [hereinafter GAO/T-HEHS-98-20]. From 1995
to 1997, the DOL certified ninety-nine percent of the 3,689 H-2A applications filed nationwide,
enabling growers to regularly obtain H-2A workers. See id.
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employment of H-2A workers will adversely effect the wages and
working conditions of workers in the U.S."6 An employer petitioning
for an H-2A worker must apply to the DOL for certification that a
sufficient number of "able, willing, and qualified" workers are not
available in the United States,65 and that the certification "will not
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of... similarly
employed" U.S. workers. 66 The DOL may not issue a certification if
(1) the shortage is due to a "strike or lockout," (2) the grower
violated a term of a past certification during the previous two years,
(3) the grower failed to assure the secretary that it would provide
workers' compensation insurance, or (4) the grower did not make
efforts to recruit U.S. workers.
67
In addition to determining the availability of U.S. workers, the
DOL must determine (1) "the minimum level of wages, terms,
benefits, and conditions" necessary to not adversely affect U.S.
workers and (2) whether the prospective H-2A workers will be
offered that minimum. 68 The DOL sets the adverse effect wage rate
("AEWR"), a minimum wage that "must be offered and paid ... to
every H-2A worker and every U.S. worker" when H-2A workers are
sought.69 The secretary sets an AEWR for each area of the United
States.70 AEWRs for agricultural employment, excluding sheep-
herding and other "special circumstances" described in 20 C.F.R. §
655.93, equal "the annual weighted average hourly wage rate" for the
region's farmworkers, as published by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. 71  If the prevailing wage in the area and type of
agriculture is higher than the AEWR, employers must pay the
64. 20 C.F.R. § 655.90(a).
65. Id. § 655.90(b)(1)(A).
66. Id. § 655.90(b)(1)(B).
67. Id. § 655.90(b)(2). The employer must make
positive recruitment efforts within a multistate region of traditional or expected labor
supply where the Secretary finds that there are a significant number of qualified
United States workers who, if recruited, would be willing to make themselves available
for work at the time and place needed. Positive recruitment under this paragraph is in
addition to, and shall be conducted within the same time period as, the circulation
through the interstate employment service system of the employer's job offer. The
obligation to engage in positive recruitment... shall terminate on the date the H-2A
workers depart for the employer's place of employment.
Id. § 655.90(b)(2)(4).
68. Id. § 655.90(c).
69. Id. § 655.100(b).
70. See id.
71. Id. § 655.107(a).
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prevailing wage rate.72 The AEWR may not be lower than the federal
minimum wage rate.73
The grower must actively recruit U.S. workers "through the offer
of wages, terms, benefits, and conditions at least at the minimum level
or the level offered to the aliens, whichever is higher. '74 The grower
must file an H-2A application and job offer, describing the "terms
and conditions of employment," with the Employment and Training
Administration ("ETA")7 5 at least forty-five days before the workers
are needed.76 At the same time, the employer must file a copy of the
job offer with the local "[s]tate employment service agency.
77
If an employer misses the forty-five-day deadline, the ETA will
deny the certification because of insufficient time to check for the
"availability of U.S. workers."78 However, the ETA may waive the
forty-five-day requirement in emergencies. 79 In case of a denial, the
employer is entitled "to an administrative review or a de novo
hearing before an administrative law judge." 8 After filing with the
ETA, the employer and the state employment agency may begin
recruiting U.S. workers. 81  If the employer complies with all the
certification criteria, the ETA makes a determination to grant or
deny certification thirty days before the workers are needed.
82
If, during the two years after an H-2A certification is granted, the
ETA has reason to believe that the "employer violated a material
term or condition of the ... certification," it must investigate. 83 If the
ETA finds that a violation occurred, it must notify the employer that
it will not be granted any certifications for the next season.84 Multiple
violations may cause denial of certifications for two or three years.8
5
The grower must guarantee work for three-fourths of the total
72. See id. § 655.107(b).
73. See id. § 655.107(c). The current federal minimum wage is $5.15 per hour. 29 U.S.C. §
206(a)(1).
74. 20 C.F.R. § 655.90(c). The Employment and Training Administration of the DOL is
charged with making certification determinations. See id. § 655.92.
75. The ETA is a division of the DOL.
76. 20 C.F.R. § 655.100(a)(1).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 655.100(a)(3).
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See id. § 655.100(a)(4)(i).
82. See id.
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contract period.86 If the employer fails to provide the required work,
the employer must pay the worker for the guaranteed period.87
Recent cases show that H-2A workers are employed in apple88
and fruit89 orchards, sugarcane fields, 90 and tree farms,9' performing
work such as irrigation92 and cultivating and harvesting vegetables. 93
They are also heavily employed by the sheepherding industry.94 H-2A
workers historically come from Jamaica, Barbados, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent, Dominica, and Mexico.9 Recently, workers have also been
recruited from the Philippines.
96
2. Case Law
For several reasons, discussed below,97 H-2A workers are
unlikely to assert their rights in court. When H-2A workers do bring
a case to court, they rarely meet with success. Courts have allowed
growers who employ H-2A workers to contract out of statutory wage
requirements98 and to legally avoid complying with the Fair Housing
Act ("FHA"). 99 An attempt to secure statutorily required wages for
H-2A workers met with fourteen years of delay within the DOL and
the courts, and was finally dismissed for mootness due to a change in
the industry.100
In Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida v. Pinnock, the
appellate court allowed a growers association to contract out of its
86. See id. § 655.102(b)(6).
87. See id.
88. See NAACP v. United States Sugar Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Comit6
de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas v. United States Dep't of Labor, 995 F.2d 510, 512 (4th
Cir. 1993).
89. See Frederick County Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Martin, 968 F.2d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
90. See United States Sugar, 84 F.3d at 1435.
91. See Blake v. H-2A and H-2B Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Ass'n, 952 F. Supp.
927, 928 (D. Conn. 1997).
92. See Trejo v. Snake River Farmers Ass'n, No. 92-TAE-4, 1992 WL 205495, at *1 (Bd.
Alien Lab. Cert. App. Aug. 13, 1992).
93. See In re Riggs Farm, No. 92-TLC-13, 1992 WL 181950, at *1 (Bd. Alien Lab. Cert.
App. July 23, 1992); In re Suzuki Farms, No. 91-TAE-4, 1991 WL 172131, at *1 (Bd. Alien Lab.
Cert. App. Aug. 9, 1991).
94. See discussion infra Part II.A.5.
95. See Semler, supra note 7, at 201, 203-05.
96. See Jim Steinberg, Farm Labor Imports Reap Controversy, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 22, 1999,
at Al.
97. See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
98. See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Pinnock, 735 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999), cert. denied, 744 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1999).
99. See Farmer v. Employment Sec. Comm'n of N.C., 4 F.3d 1274,1275 (4th Cir. 1993).
100. See NAACP v. United States Sugar Corp., 84 F.3d 1432, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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statutory responsibility to employ H-2A workers for three-fourths of
the contract period. 101 Sugarcane hand-harvesters from Jamaica and
other Caribbean islands entered the United States on H-2A visas.
10 2
Their contract, which was negotiated by the West Indies Central
Labour Organization (allegedly on behalf of the workers) and the
Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (on behalf of the
employers), provided that the workers would harvest from November
1988 to April 30, 1989, "unless work opportunity is sooner
terminated" as provided by the agreement. 103 As required by regu-
lations, the contract guaranteed the workers employment for at least
three-fourths of the workdays during the contract period. 1°4 But the
contract gave growers the power to terminate the employment at any
earlier time, as long as they gave ten days notice. 105 Originally,
employment under the contract was to terminate on April 30, 1989,
but the employers provided notice and moved the termination date
forward to March 16, 1989.106 The growers claimed that the
employment termination also terminated the period from which the
three-fourths work guarantee was calculated, ending the growers'
wage liability on March 16.107 The workers, however, demanded
wages amounting to the three-fourths guarantee for the period from
March 16 through April 30.108 The appellate court held in favor of the
growers, reasoning that the contract was not ambiguous, and
therefore the work guarantee terminated after the ten days' notice. 109
The court in Farmer v. Employment Security Commission of
North Carolina"10 allowed growers who hire H-2A workers to avoid
complying with the FHA. 111 In Farmer, several female and child H-
2A workers claimed that the defendants violated the FHA and
discriminated against them based on familial status." 2  The
101. 735 So. 2d at 531.
102. See id. The growers in Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida employed
approximately 10,000 H-2A workers during the years at issue. See id.
103. Id. at 532.
104. See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(6). The regulation requires that the grower guarantee
employment for at least three-fourths of the work contract. See id. If the employer does not
offer work for three-fourths of the work period, the employer must pay the worker what the
worker would have earned had he or she worked three-fourths of the work period. See id.
105. See Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla., 735 So. 2d at 533.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 534.
109. See id. at 535-36.
110. 4 F.3d 1274 (4th Cir. 1993).
111. Id. at 1284.
112. Id. at 1275.
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defendants countered that IRCA governs the housing conditions of
H-2A workers, and that agricultural employers must provide family
housing to foreign workers only where it is the prevailing practice."1 3
The court agreed with the defendants and held that H-2A employers
must only provide benefits as detailed in 20 C.F.R. § 655.102,114 even
when their actions violate the FHA. 115  In short, where H-2A
employers are concerned, IRCA trumps the FHA.
116
In NAACP v. United States Sugar Corp.,'17 the plaintiffs, a class
of H-2A sugarcane workers, filed suit against several growers and the
DOL, contesting the DOL's interpretation of the H-2A piece-rate
regulation." 8 Regulations require that the growers pay H-2A workers
the AEWR, which functions as a minimum wage for H-2A workers."9
When employers pay workers on a piece-rate system, based on a
standard unit of production, the rate must be high enough to ensure
that the employee is still paid the AEWR.120  However, under the
piece-rate system, employers can meet an increasing AEWR by
increasing the minimum productivity level required from workers
instead of increasing the per-piece rate they pay workers. 21 In other
words, a grower could require the employees to work faster to attain
the AEWR.
22
In order to avoid such abuse, the DOL adopted a regulation
requiring growers to raise their per-piece work rates, rather than their
productivity expectations, when the AEWR increased.' 23  The
problem in United States Sugar arose when sugarcane growers
adopted a "task-rate" system, where workers were paid per row of
cane harvested rather than by bushel or other typical piece-rate
113. See id. at 1279.
114. The regulations require that H-2A employers provide family housing only where it is
the prevailing practice. See 8 U.S.C. § 1188(c)(4) (2000).
115. See Farmer, 4 F.3d at 1284.
116. See id.
117. 84 F.3d 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
118. NAACP v. United States Sec'y of Labor, 846 F. Supp. 91, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The
piece-rate regulation at issue was contained in 20 C.F.R. § 655.207(c) (1983) (superceded in
1987).
119. See United States Sec'y of Labor, 846 F. Supp. at 93.
120. See id.
121. See United States Sugar, 84 F.3d at 1434.
122. See id. For example, a grower could "meet an AEWR of $5 per hour by paying 50
cents per bushel of apples,... if the farm worker picked 10 bushels per hour. But ... if the
AEWR increased.., to $6 per hour .... the grower could [require the worker to] pick 12, rather
than 10, bushels per hour," and thereby avoid paying an increased wage. Id. at 1434.
123. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.207(c).
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unit.124 The growers maintained that because they paid according to a
task rate rather than a piece rate, they were not required to increase
the rate in proportion to the annual AEWR increases.125 The DOL
allowed the growers to avoid increasing pay rates to keep up with the
AEWR. 126 The H-2A workers sued for additional wages.
127
The case languished in the courts and with the DOL for fourteen
years and, due to changes in the sugarcane industry, was eventually
dismissed for mootness and standing problems. 128 The case became
moot because the sugarcane industry abandoned the challenged task-
rate payment system, and because the growers adopted more
mechanization and abandoned the use of H-2A workers. 29 In the
end, the growers successfully avoided paying the AEWR during the
years that they used the task-rate scam.13
0
In the few cases that H-2A workers manage to bring to litigation,
the DOL and the courts fail miserably to protect the rights of H-2A
workers. They fail to enforce the statutory requirements designed to
protect H-2A workers, such as the three-fourths guarantee and the
AEWR. They also fail to protect the civil rights of H-2A workers,
such as those found in the FHA. This failure contributes to the
problems that surround the H-2A system, discussed below.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Problem
1. The Susceptibility of H-2A Workers to Abuse
H-2A workers are vulnerable to abuse and have little recourse
when they are abused. H-2A workers have fewer rights and
protections than U.S. workers. 3' Unlike other farmworkers, they are
not protected by the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Protection Act ("AWPA"). 132 They do not benefit from the "detailed
disclosure and recordkeeping" protections that the AWPA provides
124. 84 F.3d at 1435.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See United States Sec'y of Labor, 846 F. Supp. at 94.
128. See United States Sugar, 84 F.3d at 1434, 1437.
129. See id. at 1437.
130. See id.
131. See Coleman, supra note 15, at 200.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(8)(B)(ii), (10)(B)(iii) provide that the terms "migrant agricultural
worker" and "seasonal agricultural worker," as used in the AWPA, do not include temporary
nonimmigrant aliens authorized to work under the H-2A statute.
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to other workers. 33 H-2A workers may be excluded from state laws,
such as landlord-tenant laws, as well."' Regulations allow H-2A
workers to receive inferior pay during the first week of work. 35 While
labor regulations guarantee wages for the first week of work to
domestic workers referred through the interstate clearance system,
these labor regulations do not afford the same protections to H-2A
workers. 136 This disparity in treatment increases the "potential for
personal hardship for foreign workers." '37
Secondly, H-2A workers are not likely to assert those few rights
that they do have. They are unlikely to complain of abuses, because
they legitimately fear retaliation if they file a complaint.138 Growers
historically blacklist those who are considered troublemakers. 139
Although guest workers have a paper guarantee of labor rights, they
depend on keeping their jobs to stay in the United States.14° This
gives employers "the power not only to fire [workers] who agitate or
organize," or stand up for their rights in any other way; it also gives
employers the power to, in effect, deport workers who make their
voices heard. 141 The unwritten rules that H-2A workers must heed
are: "Work fast, or lose your job to somebody who is faster.
Complain about your living or working conditions, and you're sent
back to Mexico. Get sick or injured, and you're off the list of workers
invited back next season. 1 4 Following the unwritten rules too strictly
133. Semler, supra note 7, at 207.
134. See Ward, supra note 41. H-2A workers are not protected by North Carolina laws
governing landlord-tenant contracts. See id. Until a legal challenge in 1999, North Carolina H-
2A workers lacked "the right to invite guests to their quarters after hours." Id.
135. See GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, supra note 16, at 10.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. See Coleman, supra note 15, at 200.
139. See id.; see also Semler, supra note 7, at 209 n.116. Semler wrote:
A worker who seriously displeases his employer, to the point that he is involuntarily
repatriated during the season, is placed on the black or "u-list" of unacceptables who
are forever barred from H-2 agricultural employment in the U.S. The H-2 who is u-
listed is not only fired and banned from the industry, he is for all practical purposes
barred from the U.S. labor market for life.
Id. Even H-lB workers, who are nonimmigrant professionals with postgraduate degrees, are
unlikely to complain for fear they will be deported. See Constantine S. Potamianos, The
Temporary Admission of Skilled Workers to the United States Under the H-1B Program:
Economic Boon or Domestic Work Force Scourge?, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 789, 808 n.175
(Summer 1997).
140. See David Bacon, INS Declares War on Labor: Ethnic Cleansing Hits Immigrant
Workers, Organizers, in Midwest Meatpacking, NATION, Oct. 25, 1999, at 18.
141. Id.
142. Ward, supra note 41.
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can cause death by heat stroke or pesticide poisoning.14 3 But not
following the rules can cause a worker to be blacklisted-not allowed
to return for the next season. 144
In 1998, a thirty-six-year-old tomato picker named Carmelo
Fuentes, working in North Carolina on an H-2A visa, suffered severe
brain damage due to heat stroke after his supervisor ignored the signs
of heat stress.145  Afraid of not being hired next season, Carmelo
allegedly said all he needed was a quick break. 146  When Carmelo
returned to Mexico, able only to lie "mute and motionless on a bed,"
his father tried without success to learn what had happened. 147 The
workers who went to North Carolina with Carmelo would say
nothing.148 Carmelo's father believes they were told not to talk, or
they could never return.4 9
The goal is "to keep workers silent and productive" and to
prevent them from seeking legal help if their rights are violated. 150
The result: no H-2A worker in North Carolina has ever made a
complaint with a government agency. 51 The only complaints have
been made by "farm worker advocates or church groups.'
'5 2
In exchange for an H-2A visa, "workers give up considerable
control over their lives."' 53  Most do not see their employment
contract until they arrive in the state in which they will work.
154
Unlike traditional migrant workers, H-2A workers do not choose
their employer, and they cannot negotiate their wages or hours.
155








150. Id. The Charlotte Observer reported that legal aid attorneys gave pamphlets to a group
of H-2A workers when they entered the United States, but when the workers arrived in North
Carolina the growers association told them that "they would be sent back to Mexico if they" did
not throw away the pamphlets, or if they associated with Legal Services of North Carolina. Id.
The pamphlets instruct the workers in how to calculate their wages and how the grower must
live up to its part of the contract. See id.
151. See id.
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a limited ability to protect them, because H-2A employers may cease
recruiting from a country and switch to a new source at any time."56
The DOL is responsible for enforcing H-2A workers' rights, but
it seldom intervenes.'57 Part of the difficulty in enforcing H-2A
workers' rights is that the workers are in the United States for only a
short period of time before returning to their own countries. For
example, employers must pay H-2A workers wages equivalent to at
least three-fourths of the amount specified for the entire contract
period.15 8 However, since employers can fulfill that requirement only
at the end of a contract period, and H-2A workers must leave the
country as soon as the contract ends, the DOL cannot effectively
monitor the three-fourths guarantee. 15 9
According to a December 1997 government report by the
General Accounting Office, Congress's investigative arm, the
enforcement difficulties create an incentive for growers to request
contract periods longer than needed: If H-2A workers leave the job
before the contract ends, the grower is not required to honor the
three-fourths guarantee or pay the workers' return transportation
costs. 160 The regulations that exist to protect workers are difficult to
enforce.161 H-2A workers tend to be less aware of U.S. laws than
domestic workers and are unlikely to complain of violations because
of fear that they will lose their jobs or will not be hired in the future. 162
When H-2A workers do attempt to enforce their rights, courts
are reluctant to find in their favor.163 In addition, an H-2A worker
may have difficulty finding representation from the farmworker
offices funded by the Legal Services Corporation ("LSC"), which
typically represent agricultural workers. The LSC is only authorized
to serve aliens who are present in the United States. 164 The LSC has
156. See Semler, supra note 7, at 208.
157. See GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, supra note 16, at 3; Semler, supra note 7, at 208.
158. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(6); supra Part I.B.1.
159. See GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, supra note 16, at 9-10.
160. See id. at 10.
161. See id. at 6.
162. See id. at 9. During 1996, the DOL received zero complaints from H-2A workers,
although it is likely that some workers were not paid their guaranteed wages. See id. Labor
officials noted that "it is hard to ensure that abusive employers do not participate in the H-2A
program." Id.
163. The court in Sugar Cane Growers Coop. of Fla. v. Pinnock, 735 So. 2d 530, 535 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1999), discussed supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text, allowed the growers
to terminate the sugarcane workers from Jamaica a month and a half before the contract period
ended, without paying the three-fourths guarantee.
164. See Legal Services Corporation, Public Hearing; Comment Request Notice, 64 Fed.
Reg. 8140, 8141 (1999) (citing Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
2000]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
noted that this requirement particularly affects H-2A workers who
must leave the United States before their legal problems are resolved,
"making effective representation for [H-2A workers] questionable.' 1 65
2. The Modern State of Involuntary Servitude
It is not a new idea, particularly in agriculture, for employers to
wield almost complete control over workers by making it nearly
impossible for them to quit. Slavery is the most extreme example, but
creative growers have found other ways to keep their workers in a
state of involuntary servitude. 166  Involuntary servitude was a
particularly frequent problem in the decades following the Civil
War,167 but it occasionally occurs now.16
The Thirteenth Amendment bans slavery and involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for duly convicted crimes.169 The
leading case defining involuntary servitude is United States v.
Kozminski, decided in 1988. In Kozminski, the Supreme Court held
that involuntary servitude occurs when an employer compels service
through "the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion."' 70
The Court did not limit the meaning of legal coercion to penal
compulsion. 7'
In Kozminski, the coercion was physical.'72 The Kozminskis
operated a dairy farm, where two developmentally disabled men
worked as farm hands for more than fifteen years.17' The men worked
"seven days a week, often [seventeen] hours per day," for no wages. 17 4
§ 504(a)(11), 110 Stat. 1321, 1354, incorporated by reference in Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681). The
LSC notes that it is not clear whether LSC-funded agencies may represent aliens who initiated
the representation while in the United States, and then left the country, or whether the alien
must be physically present in the United States at the time the representation is provided. See
id. at 8141. The LSC has issued a request for comments and a public hearing to determine
which is the correct interpretation of the statute. See id.
165. Id.
166. In a recent article, The Nation referred to guest-worker programs as indentured
servitude. See Bacon, supra note 140.
167. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 504-06 (2d ed. 1985).
168. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 938-39 (1988).
169. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
170. 487 U.S. at 952-53 (emphasis added).
171. See id.
172. Id. at 935-36.
173. See id. at 934-35.
174. Id. at 935.
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The Kozminskis physically and verbally abused the men and did not
allow them to leave the farm. 75
A much earlier case stated that the nineteenth-century padrone
system is a form of involuntary servitude, due to physical coercion.1
76
Under that system, padrones brought young boys from Italy to the
United States to work as street musicians or beggars. 177 Although the
boys and their families generally agreed to the servitude and the
padrones were not known to physically brutalize the boys, the court
found that the boys had no actual means of escaping the padrone's
control and, therefore, physical coercion existed.'
78
In the post-Civil War cases, the coercion was generally effected
through legal sanction. The Black Codes of 1865, designed to tie
workers to their "employers," criminalized breach of an employment
contract.179  The codes required black employees to enter written
labor contracts.180 Blacks caught without an employment contract
were "arrested as vagrants.''8 Once arrested, they were "auctioned
off to" growers "who paid their criminal fines."'' 82 Under the Black
Codes, a "black laborer who quit 'without good cause' [was] arrested
and taken back to [the] employer.' 183 The result was that a black
laborer had to enter an employment contract, and if he or she broke
the contract, criminal sanctions ensued. 184
When Congress eradicated the Black Codes with the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, passed in 1868, the
South invented a new, similar system. 185 The new system was a set of
laws designed to tie blacks to their employers, preventing them from
175. See id.
176. See United States v. Ancarola, 1 F. 676, 683-84 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1880).
177. See id at 678-80. The padrones sometimes paid the families for the boys, and they were
responsible for feeding, clothing, and sheltering them. See id.
178. See id. at 683-84. Circumstances leading to the conclusion that consent was a sham
include the boys' "condition[s] in life," their ages and inexperience, their lack of any other
means of support, and their inabilities to profit from their work. Id. at 683.
179. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 167, at 504.
180. See id.
181. Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 340, 344 n.96
(1994). Louisiana required "African American agricultural laborers.., to make year-long
binding contracts with" growers. Id. "If they refused [the] work," they were "arrested and
forced to do uncompensated labor on public [projects] until they agreed to return to their
employers." Id.
182. Id.
183. FRIEDMAN, supra note 167, at 504.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 505.
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changing jobs. 86 The new laws did not mention race, but they were
"directed only against black workers."' 87  Enticement laws crimi-
nalized luring workers to new jobs, even by merely offering a higher
wage. 188 Other laws made it a crime to quit a job "fraudulently.' 1 9
The laws, by imposing criminal sanctions on employees who left
before their contracts expired, prevented black workers from leaving
their employers. 19°
In 1911, the Supreme Court held in Bailey v. Alabama that a
statute that compelled completion of a contract, under the sanction of
criminal law, violated the Thirteenth Amendment. 19 The Court
concluded that a contract for service is not valid unless the employee
can choose at any time to break it.19 Additionally, laws compelling
an employee to continue to perform the service violate the Thirteenth
Amendment. 93 The focus in defining involuntary servitude is not on
whether the contracting is involuntary or voluntary, but on whether
the service is forced. 94 The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits the
status or condition of involuntary servitude, regardless of the manner
in which the condition was created.1 95 It is the compulsion to serve
that is prohibited. 96
Like plantation owners in the Black Code era, modern growers
control H-2A workers through legal coercion. Because an H-2A





190. See id. at 504-05; see also William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South,
1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31, 33 (1976).
191. 219 U.S. 219, 243-44 (1911). The Alabama statute made breach of an employment
contract prima facie evidence of criminal fraud. See id. Bailey left his job before finishing his
one-year labor contract and without repaying the $15 advance he received when he began work.
See id. at 228-29. Leaving the job created a presumption of fraud that Bailey could not rebut
because Alabama's evidentiary laws prevented him from testifying on his own behalf, due to his
race. See id. at 230-31. Bailey was convicted, fined $30, and sentenced to 136 days of
imprisonment and hard labor. See id. at 231.
192. See id. at 243-44.
193. See id.
194. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1905). Clyatt is a peonage case. See id.
195. See id. at 216.
196. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 242. Three years after Bailey, in United States v. Reynolds, the
Supreme Court held that an Alabama surety statute amounted to involuntary servitude. 235
U.S. 133, 150 (1914). The statute allowed fines for a criminal conviction to be paid by a third
party. See id. at 142. In exchange, the convict was required to work for the third party for a set
amount of time. See id. If the convict failed to complete the contract, he could be assessed
additional fines and imprisonment. See id.
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her, 197 H-2A workers are virtually precluded from leaving an abusive
employer. An H-2A worker is "out of status," and therefore
deportable, if he or she leaves an employer, no matter how abusive
the employer may be.19 In many cases, deportation means not only
that the workers must return to their native countries before the end
of the contract period, but also that they will not recoup expenses
incurred in traveling to the United States. 199 This gives growers a
dangerous degree of control over H-2A workers. The grower
controls a worker's very right to stay in the United States. 200
As blacks were forced to do in the late nineteenth century, H-2A
workers must agree to work for a contract period. 0' Once they are in
the United States, they must take whatever conditions they are given.
Like the Black Codes, the H-2A system forces workers to finish their
employment contracts through legal coercion. As the Court held in
Clyatt v. United States, it is irrelevant whether a worker enters the
contract voluntarily. 2 2 The issue is whether the worker is compelled,
either through physical or legal force, to complete the period of
employment.203 The H-2A system is a form of modern involuntary
servitude.
3. Adverse Effect on U.S. Workers
Although the H-2A visa is purportedly designed to comply with
the policies of the Immigration and Nationality Act-that H-2A
workers should not be admitted unless their admission "will not
adversely affect the wages or working conditions of similarly
employed U.S. workers"2 °0 -the presence of H-2A workers in the
agricultural market does just that. The H-2A program miserably fails
to protect U.S. workers in two respects. First, the visa certification
procedure fails to determine whether U.S. workers are available and
allows employers to hire H-2A workers when domestic workers are
ready to take the job.205 Second, the employment of H-2A workers
has a strong adverse effect on wages for farmworkers -both domestic
197. See Semler, supra note 7, at 209.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 209-10.
200. See id. at 210.
201. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a).
202. 197 U.S. at 215-16.
203. See id.
204. 20 C.F.R. § 655.0(a)(1)(ii).
205. See supra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Semler, supra note 7, at 206.
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and foreign. 206 A recent General Accounting Office report recom-
mended changes in the H-2A program to "better protect the wages
and working conditions of both domestic and foreign workers.
'207
a. Loss of Jobs to U.S. Workers
When agricultural employers have an opportunity to secure the
modern equivalent of indentured servants-H-2A workers who have
little opportunity to protest their salaries and working conditions, and
who are, as a practical matter, precluded from leaving their
employers-the growers have little incentive to seek U.S. workers.
While recruiting U.S. migrant workers requires that the employer
build relationships with crew leaders, family representatives, and
workers, and make binding commitments well before the season
begins, an employer who recruits foreign workers is able to wait until
the last minute before requesting and receiving "exactly the number
requested, at exactly the designated time. '208  In addition, some
growers say that H-2A workers work harder and are easier to control
than U.S. workers.2°9
Recruiting H-2A workers allows employers to hire only young
men-a preferable choice for growers who do not wish to provide
family housing for the typical U.S. migrant family group.
210
Employers who recruit H-2A workers are not bound by equal
employment or affirmative action obligations. 211 Even when
employers do recruit female H-2A workers who may travel with
children, they are not required to provide family housing unless
family housing is the "prevailing practice" in the area and in that type
of employment.2 12  Growers may deny family housing to H-2A
workers even when that denial violates the FHA, because IRCA
trumps the FHA.21 3
206. See Semler, supra note 7, at 211.
207. GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, supra note 16, at 2.
208. Semler, supra note 7, at 206. In addition, the grower may easily "replace any worker
who [falls] ill or performs poorly." Id.
209. See Ward, supra note 41. One North Carolina grower described an H-2A worker as a
"machine in the fields," while U.S. workers lean on their hoes. Id.
210. See Semler, supra note 7, at 206. U.S. migrant workers often travel in family units that
include children and older relatives. See id.
211. See Semler, supra note 7, at 208.
212. Farmer v. Employment See. Comm'n of N.C., 4 F.3d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1993).
213. See id. at 1284.
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Because of these factors, agricultural employers elect to hire H-
2A workers even when U.S. workers are available.214 Growers favor
contract workers who, like the Braceros, are guaranteed to be
available and cannot quit until the employer is finished with them.215
The DOL faces the task of "compel[ling] domestic recruitment by
reluctant and sometimes hostile employers. '' 216 The DOL's "labor
certification system is so flawed that it does not produce a meaningful
indication of whether U.S. workers are available. ' 217 Employers, who
hope to avoid being required to hire U.S. workers, advertise openings
at times and in places where U.S. workers are unlikely to notice the
posting.218 They may fail to advertise jobs in migrant home states such
as Texas until well after the Texas migrants have left for other
states. 19 Consequently, growers, who have little incentive to hire U.S.
workers when H-2A workers are available, advertise in ways that
make it unlikely that they will be forced to hire U.S. workers, and the
DOL does little to oversee the process.220  The U.S. General
Accounting Office has accused the DOL of failing to oversee the H-
2A program effectively.
21
b. Adverse Effect on Wages and Conditions
In addition to causing less jobs to be available for domestic
workers, the H-2A visa, like the use of Bracero workers2 2 causes an
adverse effect on the wages and conditions of all agricultural laborers.
The presence of H-2A workers dramatically increases the supply of
214. See Semler, supra note 7, at 210.
215. See SCRUGGS, supra note 39, at 511.
216. Semler, supra note 7, at 210.
217. Semler, supra note 7, at 206.
218. See DUNBAR & KRAVITZ, supra note 33, at 37. Sugarcane growers in Florida avoided
being required to hire U.S. workers by advertising job openings in the summer, when the
migrants had already gone north and would not see the advertisement. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H-2A AGRICULTURAL GUESTWORKER PROGRAM:
RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS 4 (GAO/HEHS-98-120R, Apr. 2, 1998).
222. See SCRUGGS, supra note 39, at 508-09. The most frequent effect of the use of Braceros
was the freezing of wages at the levels stipulated in the contract. See id. at 508. While wages in
California's Imperial Valley rose from thirty-five to sixty cents per hour between 1941 and 1945,
when few Braceros were used in the area, wages stagnated at sixty cents during the war period,
when Braceros harvested the area's crops. See id. at 509. This wage stagnation occurred despite
the fact that the war years were a period of great demand for labor, due to World War 1I, and
despite the fact that wages in other industries, such as construction, increased dramatically
during the period. See id.
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agricultural workers. U.S. workers must work for lower pay in order
to compete.
23
Regulations require that employers provide H-2A workers with
the same minimum wages, benefits, and working conditions as those
provided to domestic workers employed in "comparable employ-
ment. ' 224 But when H-2A workers dominate a market, it becomes
impossible to determine the prevailing conditions of U.S. workers in
corresponding employment because the presence of the H-2A
workers affects the market, causing conditions that are less favorable
to workers. 225 In some industries, such as sugarcane, foreign contract
workers have dominated the market for decades, creating a
permanent, artificially low prevailing wage.2
26
The DOL determines the AEWR, to be paid to U.S. and alien
workers by H-2A employers, by determining the average hourly wage
rate for farmworkers in a region.227  H-2A employers must pay the
higher of the AEWR or the statutory minimum wage. 2 8 The AEWR
is calculated based on prevailing wages in a particular state.2 29 If H-
2A workers are employed in the state, then the AEWR is based, in
part, on their wages. Therefore, the AEWRs are artificially low, due
to the long-time presence of H-2A workers in the agricultural
market. 230 "[T]he AEWR methodology fails to recognize that when
foreign workers are admitted in significant numbers, they depress
223. See DUNBAR & KRAVITZ, supra note 33, at 1. A Texas farmworker explained:
The free enterprise system works real good if you got money, education, or profession.
You make a very good free enterprise if you got those three things. Now remember,
the farm worker hasn't got money, we don't got profession many times, and we don't
got education. So, by free enterprise, if I'm more hungry than you, I got to work
cheaper than you.
Id.
224. 20 C.F.R. § 655.90(b)(2)(3), (c).
225. See Semler, supra note 7, at 211.
226. See DUNBAR & KRAVITZ, supra note 33, at 37. During the early 1970s, more than ten
thousand Jamaican contract workers entered Florida annually to cut sugarcane. See id.
Plantation owners preferred the Jamaican workers to United States-born workers, because they
were "more manageable," and because they left their families in Jamaica. Id. at 38.
227. See Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Labor
Certification Process for the Temporary Employment of Aliens in Agriculture and Logging in
the United States: 1999 Adverse Effect Wages Rates, Allowable Charges for Agricultural and
Logging Workers' Meals, and Maximum Travel Subsistence Reimbursement Notice, 64 Fed.
Reg. 6689, 6690 (1999) [hereinafter Labor Certification Process].
228. See id.
229. 20 C.F.R. § 655.100(b).
230. Large numbers of undocumented farmworkers also cause wages to be unnaturally low.
See Ky Henderson, The New Slavery: Immigrants Hoping to Forge a Better Life Are at the Mercy
of Greedy Smugglers, 24 HUM. RTS. 12, 13 (Fall 1997).
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agricultural wages throughout the state. '23 1 Increasing the supply of
workers by more than one hundred percent inevitably depresses
wages. 232
Current AEWRs range from $6.21 per hour in Arkansas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi to $8.97 per hour in Hawaii.233  The
AEWRs for most states are between $6.21 and $7.25 per hour.
234
NAACP v. United States Sugar Corp. serves as an example of
problems in applying the AEWR.235 The case illustrates that, when
forced to pay a fair AEWR, agricultural employers sometimes
abandon their use of H-2A workers. 23 6  The use of H-2A workers,
despite alleged statutory intent to the contrary, adversely affects
wages in the United States due to the availability of foreign workers
who will accept artificially low wages.237  The DOL bows to the
demands of agricultural employers, rather than accepting its duty to
protect U.S. and H-2A workers. 238
4. The H-2A Program Is Not Necessary to Thwart a Shortage of
Labor
The H-2A visa was created to allow growers to request guest
workers in times of labor shortage.239 But rather than using H-2A
workers only when labor shortages occur, agricultural employers,
until a recent expansion of H-2A worker use, have recruited H-2A
workers fairly steadily.2 40 From 1974 to 1978, the Immigration and
231. Semler, supra note 7, at 211. For a detailed discussion of the flaws in the calculation of
the AEWR, see id. at 211-12.
232. See id. at 210. In 1992, approximately 10,000 H-2A certifications were granted for the
sugarcane industry alone. NAACP v. United States Sec'y of Labor, 846 F. Supp. 91, 96 (D.D.C.
1994).
233. See Labor Certification Process, supra note 227, at 6690.
234. See id.
235. 84 F.3d 1432 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
236. See 84 F.3d at 1439.
237. See Semler, supra note 7, at 211.
238. The DOL allowed sugarcane employers to avoid paying the AEWR by characterizing
their payment systems as task rate rather than piece rate, when DOL regulations only
characterize H-2A wages as piece rate or hourly. See United States Sec'y of Labor, 846 F. Supp.
at 93. Clearly, the task rate functions as a piece rate, and allows employers to avoid AEWR
raises by manipulating the time it takes to complete the task. Several other cases in the past
decade have focused on the DOL's application of the AEWR piece rate, or problems in
applying the AEWR when the employer changes the method of calculating payment, perhaps
with the intention of paying a lower wage. See, e.g., Comit6 de Apoyo a los Trabajadores
Agrfcolas v. United States Dep't of Labor, 995 F.2d 510, 512 (4th Cir. 1993); Frederick County
Fruit Growers Ass'n v. Martin, 968 F.2d 1265, 1266-67 (D.C. Cir. 1992); AFL-CIO v. Dole, 884
F.2d 597, 598-99 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
239. See GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, supra note 16, at 3.
240. See Semler, supra note 7, at 187-88.
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Naturalization Service ("INS") admitted approximately 10,500
agricultural H-2 workers per year.24' From 1990 to 1996, INS
admitted an average of 13,412.2 H-2A workers annually.2 42 Recently,
grower use of H-2A workers has expanded rapidly, "up from
17,000... [five] years ago to approximately 30,000 in 1998. '243 H-2A
visas are not granted only in times of labor shortage.244 Indeed, it is
on a rare occasion that the DOL denies a request for H-2A
workers:245 during 1996 and 1997, the DOL approved ninety-nine
percent of all H-2A applications. 2
46
A government study on the H-2A visa reports that "[a] sudden
widespread farm labor shortage requiring the importation of large
numbers of foreign workers is unlikely to occur in the near future. ''247
The report concludes that, while localized labor shortages may
occasionally occur in specific crops or locations, no widespread
shortage is likely to occur.248  This conclusion is based on a large
number of farmworkers who are lawful, permanent residents and
high, continuous unemployment rates in agricultural areas, lasting
even during peak agricultural periods.2 49 For example, in Florida in
1997, there were two U.S. farmworkers waiting to fill "every farm
labor job." 0 H-2A workers are not necessary to alleviate localized
241. See id. at 187. Before 1986, when Congress created the H-2A and H-2B visas,
agricultural and nonagricultural workers were admitted under the H-2 program. See id. at 187
& n.4. Approximately 30,000 H-2 workers were admitted each year between 1974 and 1978, and
thirty-five percent of those were agricultural workers. See id. at 187 & n.3.
242. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1996
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 120 tbl.39
(1997). Yearly numbers of H-2A workers admitted were 18,219 in 1990; 14,628 in 1993; 13,185
in 1994; 11,394 in 1995; and 9,635 in 1996. Id. Statistics for 1991 and 1992 were not available in
the INS report.
243. James S. Holt, Ph.D., Senior Economist, McGuiness & Williams, The H-2A Foreign
Worker Recruitment Program: The Future of Agricultural Labor, Address at the Michigan
State Horticultural Society Annual Meeting, Grand Rapids, Michigan (Dec. 9,1998).
244. See GAO/T-HEHS-98-20, supra note 63, at 6.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 8. Between October 1, 1995, and June 30, 1997, the DOL certified ninety-
nine percent of the 3,689 applications for H-2A workers filed nationwide. See id.
247. Id. at 5.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 7. The report's analysis of unemployment in "20 large agricultural counties,"
which produce "fruit, tree nut and vegetable[s]," indicated that
13 counties maintained annual double-digit unemployment rates, and 19 had rates
above the national average during 1994 through 1996. As of June 1997, 11 counties
still exhibited monthly unemployment rates double the national average of 5.2 percent,
and 15 of the 20 counties had rates at least 2 percentage points higher than the national
rate. Only two of the counties had unemployment rates below the June 1997 national
average.
Id. at 6-7.
250. Henderson, supra note 230, at 13.
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labor shortages. Employers should offer employment terms
favorable enough to entice workers from other parts of the United
States. Instead, excess U.S. workers result in farm labor wage rates
that are stagnant or declining as adjusted for inflation.251
The report further explains that increased INS raids on
undocumented workers, which could cause farm labor shortages, are
unlikely to occur. 25 2 INS dedicates few of its resources to raiding
agricultural employers, due to "competing enforcement priorities"
and its policy of conducting raids only in response to complaints.2 3
"INS officials around the country were unanimous in their statements
that they do not expect their enforcement efforts to have any general
impact on the supply of farm labor either nationally or regionally.
254
5. Underview: The Case of the Sheepherding Industry
In the sheepherding industry, the H-2A system fails miserably to
protect both U.S. and foreign workers. Regulations allow the U.S.
Employment Service to set special rules and procedures for handling
H-2A applications from certain employers, when the employers
demonstrate that the special procedures are necessary, or "in occu-
pations characterized by other than a reasonably regular workday or
workweek," such as sheepherding. 255  A DOL field memorandum
outlines the special procedures for sheepherders under the H-2A pro-
gram.256  The memorandum indicates that special procedures are
necessary because:
The unique occupational characteristics of sheepherding (spending
extended periods of time grazing herds of sheep in isolated
mountainous terrain; being on call to protect flocks from predators
24 hours a day, 7 days a week) have been recognized ... as
significant factors in limiting the number of U.S. workers who
might be interested in and capable of performing these jobs.25 7
251. See GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, supra note 16, at 4.
252. See GAO/T-HEHS-98-20, supra note 63, at 7.
253. GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, supra note 16, at 2. INS receives few complaints involving
agricultural employers. See id. INS focuses its raiding efforts on "identifying aliens who have
committed criminal acts, including violent criminal alien gang and drug-related activity, and on
detecting and deterring fraud and smuggling." GAO/T-HEHS-98-20, supra note 63, at 7.
254. GAO/T-HEHS-98-20, supra note 63, at 7.
255. 20 C.F.R. § 655.93(b) (2000).
256. See Field Memorandum No. 74-89 from Donald J. Kulick, Administrator, Office of
Regional Management, Employment and Training Administration, United States Department
of Labor, to All Regional Administrators (May 31, 1989) (on file with the Chicago-Kent Law




The United States admits sheepherders as temporary farm-
workers for three-year periods, although, by the DOL's own
admission, "most sheepherding jobs are neither temporary nor
seasonal. '' 258 Congress agreed to admit sheepherders on H-2A visas in
response to a perceived problem with earlier statutes, which, since the
1950s, allowed U.S. employers to hire sheepherders from Spain.
259
Congress agreed to admit sheepherders under the H-2 visa26° to
prevent foreign workers from quitting their sheepherding jobs to
work in other occupations.
261
H-2A workers dominate the sheepherding industry in the
western United States. The Western Range Association ("WRA"),
which acts as an intermediary between potential H-2A workers and
ranchers, serves the majority of western sheep ranchers who employ
H-2A workers. 262  The DOL has authorized a special application
procedure that allows master applications and job orders specifically
for the WRA. 63 The special sheepherder regulations specifically
authorize an employer to require a worker to be "on call for up to 24
hours per day, 7 days per week," exempting that employer from the
record-keeping requirements 264 of other H-2A workers.2 65 In addition,
sheepherder employers are exempt from 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(d),
which requires other H-2A employers to submit a "positive
recruitment plan" -or plan to recruit U.S. workers.266 Finally, sheep
ranchers who employ H-2A workers enjoy different housing
requirements than other H-2A employers.267 Although sheepherders
258. Id. at 2.
259. See id.
260. The IRCA of 1986 divided the H-2 visa into two categories, establishing the H-2A
program for importing foreign workers to perform temporary agricultural jobs. See supra note
57 and accompanying text.
261. See Field Memorandum No. 74-89, supra note 256, at 2.
262. See id. at 3.
263. See id.
264. EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SPECIAL PROCEDURES:
LABOR CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR SHEEPHERDERS UNDER THE H-2A PROGRAM 2,
appended to Field Memorandum No. 74-89, supra note 256.
265. 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(7) and (8) require growers to record the number of hours
offered and worked.
266. EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., supra note 264, at 7.
267. See 20 C.F.R. § 655.102(b)(ii). Range employers may certify their own housing. See
EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., supra note 264, at 15. Mobile housing sites must be well
drained, contain a water supply and individual drinking cups, and include facilities for disposal
of excreta and liquid waste. See id. If outhouse facilities require burying waste, they must be
kept fly-tight. See id. at 16. Heating must be provided when necessary for the safety and health
of the worker. See id. The employer must also provide lighting or lanterns; "movable bathing,
laundry and handwashing facilities" when running water is not feasible; a means of storing food,
"such as a butane or propane gas refrigerator," or a means of salting food; cooking space,
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work year-round for three-year periods, often in snowy, mountainous
regions, tents are suitable housing under the regulations.
2 68
The United States should not award such a subsidy to sheep
ranchers, allowing them to hold workers in a state of modern
involuntary servitude. The field memorandum shows that Congress
intentionally created a system to prevent sheepherders from seeking
work in other industries.269 The United States should not subsidize
agribusiness in such a way that it creates wages so low as to put U.S.
workers out of work. If U.S. workers are not willing to be on call
twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, foreign workers should
not be required to do so. Employers should be required to pay wages
high enough and provide working conditions decent enough to attract
workers within the United States.
270
B. Solutions
1. Discard the H-2A Program
Agricultural employers, like employers in other industries,
should be forced to pay wages and provide working conditions
sufficient to attract U.S. workers. Not all growers believe that
economic necessity requires providing workers with the worst
conditions allowable by the law.271 Bill Grasmick, of Grasmick
Incorporated, a large farm in Colorado between Lamar and Granada,
attributes some of the success of his business to dedicated migrant
workers, whose loyalty stems from the good treatment and housing
his company provides.272 He told the Lamar Daily News that, due to
his company's attempts to make the workers' stays "as comfortable as
possible," families who have worked for the Grasmicks since the
1950s will drop what they are doing in order to be available for the
beginning of a season.273 To create a pleasant atmosphere, the
Grasmicks provide thirty well-maintained and air-conditioned mobile
garbage containers and disposal; insect sprays; a "bed, cot or bunk"; and a fire extinguisher and
first-aid kit. Id. at 17-19. Housing standards for other agricultural workers are set out at 20
C.F.R. §§ 654.400-.417 (2000).
268. See EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., supra note 264, at 16. Tents are suitable
when rough terrain does not permit the use of more substantial housing. See id.
269. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
270. For example, ranchers could hire sheepherders in teams of two, rather than requiring
one worker to be on call at all times.
271. See John Kennon, Grasmick Brothers: Family Farm Life Filled with Trials and
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homes throughout the farms. 27 4 Grasmick attests that making the
families feel comfortable makes good business sense. 275 He told the
Lamar Daily News that "[i]f we didn't treat these people right, we
wouldn't have them coming back to us 30 years later. '
276
2. Modify the H-2A Program
If the H-2A program is not discarded, it should be modified to
better protect foreign and domestic workers, contain a more accurate
AEWR, and be used only in the event of a real shortage of domestic
labor. Regulations should be modified to allow workers with abusive
bosses an alternative to being deported. This result could be achieved
by allowing the employee to switch to another employer.
Pay for agricultural workers should be allowed to rise to an
adequate living wage, acceptable to U.S. workers. If we make the
policy choice that we want to invite foreign workers to the United
States, we must bring them in as workers with rights, not as modern
indentured servants who have little recourse against employer abuse,
and who remain in this country only at the will of the employer, even
though they may have spent thousands of dollars in order to get to
the United States.
H-2A visas should only be available when a domestic labor
shortage actually exists. The DOL should remove the employers'
incentive to locate job advertisements where U.S. farmworkers are
unlikely to see them. Employers should be required to make an
earnest attempt to hire workers within the United States. The term
"shortage" should not mean that no local worker is willing to work
for a substandard wage under substandard conditions. Shortage
should mean that no workers, anywhere within the United States, are
willing to work at a reasonable price. A price is not reasonable when
only foreign workers will accept it.
In addition to decent wages, growers should make farm work
more attractive to domestic workers by providing acceptable
conditions, such as adequate housing for workers. Employers should
also develop systems to make it possible for local work forces to
harvest an area's crops, eliminating the need for a migrant work
force. One possible solution is the development of complementary
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use the same labor pool. One industry could employ workers during
the summer and fall, while the second industry employs the same
workers during the winter and spring. This arrangement would
eliminate the need for workers to migrate.
CONCLUSION
The use of agricultural guest workers has long been known to
breed worker abuse and allow agribusiness to maintain poor pay and
working conditions. The H-2A visa is detrimental to farmworkers
both abroad and within the United States. Current trends indicate
that unless Congress acts, agribusiness will continue to expand its use
of H-2A workers, exploiting this source of involuntary servitude. The
number of H-2A workers who entered the United States rose from
15,000 in 1996 to 21,000 in 1997.277 North Carolina, the largest user of
H-2A workers, employed an estimated 10,500 H-2A workers during
1998, up from 168 in 1989.278 An estimated 30,000 H-2A workers
entered the United States in 1999, and growers are lobbying to
expand the program. 279 According to a report presented at the
Michigan State Horticultural Society's December 1998 annual
meeting, the trend is likely to continue in future years. 280 The title of
the report describes the H-2A foreign worker program as "The
Future of Agricultural Labor."'281 If the H-2A program is allowed to
continue in its current form, it is likely that the increased presence of
H-2A workers will have a much more significant impact on domestic
agricultural workers. Congress must act to modify or eliminate the
H-2A visa.
277. See GAO/T-HEHS-98-200, supra note 16, at 1.
278. See Ward, supra note 41. The North Carolina Growers Association supplies H-2A
workers to 1,050 North Carolina growers and to growers in sixteen other states. See id.
279. See id.
280. See Holt, supra note 243.
281. Id.
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